

THE CHALLENGE OF MAO TSE-TUNG

A. Communist Counter-Revolutions

"There are people that think that Marxism can cure any disease. We should tell them that dogmas are more useless than cow dung. Dung can be used as fertilizer."—Mao Tse-tung

1) *Of Wars and Revolutions as an "Eight-Legged Essay"*²⁵⁷

The Sino-Soviet rift has produced a raft of r-r-revolutionary statements from the Chinese Communist Party that picture Mao as a "Marxist-Leninist" in unsullied revolutionary armor who carries on a single-handed global struggle against "revisionism." The West's daily press does nothing to upset the simplicity and coherence of this fairy tale because it is all too eager to stress the power rift between Russia and China. The battle of quotations that first broke out openly in 1960, with Mao leaning heavily on Lenin's *State and Revolution*, and Khrushchev favoring Lenin's *Infantile Sickness of Leftism in Communism*, is, to use a phrase of Mao's on another occasion, an "eight-legged essay." In the process all words have lost their meaning.

* I wish to thank a young scholar, Jonathan Spence, for some of the research for this chapter, and I am indebted for his knowledge of the Chinese language. The analysis of the material and the political conclusions are, naturally, mine alone.

The whole history of Mao proves him to have been a fighter, not against "revisionism," but against "dogmatism," the present revolutionary-sounding statements that thunder out from Communist China notwithstanding. Mao's accusation of Khrushchev as a coward who moved over from "fear of nuclear blackmail" to "fear of revolution," and Khrushchev's expression of "sadness" that the "Chinese comrades" could join the reactionary "atom mongers and madmen," are no more than tools forged to serve the narrow purpose of power politics. This is not to say that the ideological battle is without influence on the power struggle, and, moreover, has a logic of its own. But we must not let the fact that both contestants call themselves Communist hide their class nature: both are capitalistic to the marrow of their bones. State-capitalism changes the form, not the content, of these totalitarian regimes. It is no accident that the propulsion toward open conflict came from internal, not external causes. 1959, the first breaking point between Russia and China, was not only the year of Khrushchev's visit to the United States where he helped create the "spirit of Camp David"; nor is it only the year of China's first incursion into Indian territory. It is the year of crisis within Russia and within China, especially the latter. This was brought about by a combination of natural calamities and an inhuman drive by the totalitarian rulers to industrialize, collectivize and "communize" the vast land with one "Great Leap Forward." Instead of achieving overnight any new social order, 650 million human beings²⁵⁸ were to face famine and near famine conditions. The voices of revolt came from within, not from without, mainland China. The battle of quotations, however, are directed toward the outside. Because these two state-capitalist regimes calling themselves Communist are involved in a contest for influence over the new African, Asian and Latin-American world, where the Marxian theory of liberation is a polarizing force for freedom fighters, the battle is fought out in the language of "Marxism-Leninism." Because ours is not only a nuclear age but the age of the struggle for the minds of men, any contest with "the most vicious enemy, American imperialism," requires that one have ideological as well as power "positions of strength." It is within this context that we must view the challenge of Mao Tse-tung, and, indeed, it is within this framework that Mao threw down the

gauntlet to Khrushchev for leadership over the entire Communist world.

To crown his world ambitions Mao has not shirked from taking on responsibility for a possible nuclear holocaust. The Chinese rulers have shocked all mankind by their cynical statements that China would suffer "least" were such a holocaust to break out. "Even if 200 million of us were killed, we would still have 400 million left."²⁵⁹ Mao has laughed at "nuclear war blackmail" branding all who fear nuclear war as cowards and "revisionists." As Hongqi (Red Flag) put it: "The modern revisionists are panic-stricken by the policy of nuclear war blackmail. They develop from the fear of war to the fear of revolution."²⁶⁰

This glorification of revolution is not meant for mainland China, however. It is directed against other lands. The Chinese masses would like nothing better than a revolution against their ruling class and its head, Mao Tse-tung. For one brief period voices were heard, loud and clear, in uncompromising opposition to the single party state. They were, as they expressed it, "blossoming and contending" in line with Mao's speech "let 100 flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought contend." This opposition was soon ruthlessly crushed.

It is impossible to understand the situation the Chinese rulers face now, either internally or externally, without understanding the critical years 1956-1957. Just as the Hungarian Revolution was not only a national revolution, so the discontent in China was not confined to its borders. Both events mark an historic turning point in world development as well as in class relations within state-capitalist societies.

1956 opened a new world epoch in the fight for freedom. The year began with Khrushchev, in February, calling for de-Stalinization. He hoped this would guarantee the containment of revolutionary unrest. The year ended with the Hungarian Revolution showing, beyond any peradventure of doubt, that what the Freedom Fighters want is freedom from Communism.

In February, 1957, Mao felt certain that it was still safe for him to act the benevolent "sun"²⁶¹ that would allow "100 schools of thought to contend." The Chinese people "bloomed and contended" so vigorously that they exposed the contradiction, the lie,

antagonistic contradiction between rulers and ruled, thus giving the lie to Mao's claim that he is an exponent of the Marxist theory of liberation.

The bureaucracy's incredible fanaticism and blindness to reality and to logic meant that everything had to fit into its world. If people could not be "remolded" to fit, they had to be destroyed. We face, as the starkest and most palpable reality today, what the great German philosopher Hegel—analyzing the abstract philosophic development of the "Spirit in Self-Estrangement"—had called "the absolute and universal inversion of reality and thought, their entire estrangement one from the other."²⁶²

The brief period of open dispute in China, from May 8 to mid-June, 1957, illuminates both the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the fundamental struggle of China and Russia against the United States. The life and death question of war and revolution is thereby brought into focus. Though the right to any freedom of expression in China was short-lived, and though the official sources²⁶³ did not by any means reveal the full extent of the opposition, the true sweep of freedom broke through these barriers as well as through the barriers of language. Just as the Hungarian Freedom Fighters spoke in a more universal language than Magyar, and the Swahili language of the African revolutionaries is understood by all, so, for the same reasons, we feel at one with the Chinese. They all speak the human language of freedom. Let's listen to the voices of revolt.

2) *Voices of Revolt*

Lin Hsi-ling, age 21: "True socialism is highly democratic, but the socialism we have here is not democratic. I call this society a socialism sprung from a basis of feudalism." The People's Daily, June 30, then continues, "She called them (certain phenomena in the life of our society) a class system, saying that it (i.e., class system) had already entered all aspects of life . . . she said with ulterior motives that the social productive forces in both the Soviet Union and China were very low and that these two countries had not yet eliminated class differences . . . Moreover, quoting Engels' theory that one country cannot construct socialism and Lenin's dictum that socialism is the elimination of class, she arrived at the

conclusion that present-day China and Russia are not socialist. She loudly demanded a search for 'true socialism' and advocating using explosive measures to reform the present social system."

Chang Po-sheng, head of the propaganda department of the Communist Youth League in the Normal College of Shenyang, "All kinds of important questions are decided upon by six persons—Chairman Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Premier Chou En-lai and those above the rank of the Secretary General of the Party center. The destiny of six hundred million is dictated by the pen of these six men and how can they know the actual situation? At best they can make an inspection tour of the Yellow River and swim the Yangtze." (Shenyang Daily, June 11).

"Since last year, workers in the province have involved themselves in thirteen strikes and trouble-making incidents." (Reported by New China News Agency, Canton, May 14).

Trade Unions called "Tongues of the Bureaucracy." "Trade unions were cast aside because they were concerned with production and not with the workers' welfare . . . that is why some workers in Canton, Changsha, Wuhan, Hsinhsiang and Shikiachwang dubbed their trade unions 'workers' control departments' led by the administration, 'tongues of the bureaucracy,' and 'tail of the administration,' etc. . . . Is it not a 'crisis' in the trade union work that trade unions are divorced from the masses to such a degree?" (From Li Feng's "On an 8,000-li Tour of Hurried Observations," People's Daily, May 9).

Ko P'ei-chi, Lecturer, Department of Industrial Economics, China People's University in Peking: "When the Communist Party entered the city in 1949 the common people welcomed it with food and drink and looked upon it as a benevolent force. Today the common people choose to estrange themselves from the Communist Party as if its members were gods and devils . . . The party members behave like plain-clothes police and place the masses under their surveillance. The party members are not to be blamed for this, for the party organization instructs them to gather information . . . The masses may knock you down, kill the Communists and overthrow you. The downfall of the Communist Party does not mean the downfall of China. This cannot be described as

unpatriotic for the Communists no longer serve the people . . ." (Reported in People's Daily, May 31).

Huang Chen-lu, editor of the school paper at the Normal College of Shenyang: "The Communist Party has 12 million members, less than two per cent of the total population. The 600 million people are to become the obedient subjects of this two per cent of the people. What sort of principle is this!" (Reported in Shenyang Daily, June 11).

Su P'ei-ying, China Democratic League, and Engineer of Tientsin Civil Housing Designing Board: "When the Communists first entered Tientsin, they said it was a revolution and our revolution was not a change of dynasties. They way I look at it now is that the revolution was worse than a change of dynasties and living in such a society is heartbreaking." (Reported in New China News Agency, June 9).

Lung Yun, Vice Chairman KMTRC²⁶⁴. "During the Second World War, the United States granted loans and leases to her allies. Later, some of these allies refused to pay back the loans, and the United States excused some from repayment. It will take our country more than ten years to repay the loans from the Soviet Union, if we can ever repay them. Besides, we have to pay interest to the Soviet Union. China fought for socialism, but look at the result." (Reported by the New China News Agency, June 18, as "Lung Yun's Absurd Views").

Tai Huang, New China News Agency journalist, who had joined the Communist Party in 1944: "The old ruling class has been overthrown, but a new ruling class has arisen. The evolution of this will lead to an amalgamation with Taiwan." NCNA, Peking, August 17, continues its report: "After the outbreak of the Hungarian incident, Tai Huang disapproved of the dispatch of the Soviet troops to help Hungary to suppress its counter-revolutionary rebellion . . . He slandered the people's journalistic enterprises as a 'policy to make the people ignorant.' He maliciously attacked the leaders of the New China News Agency everywhere."

NCNA, Canton, May 14: "The Communist Party Kwantung Committee has courageously and thoroughly exposed the contradictions found in current work in Kwantung . . . the contradictions

between the leadership and the masses. These find main expression in undemocratic behaviour on the part of the cadres which leads to the practice of having work carried out by coercion and command and the violation of law and discipline; the refusal to make public the accounts which has permitted quite a number of co-operative cadres to indulge in corrupt practices; the non-participation of co-operative cadres in manual work and the payment of compensation wages to them at too high a rate. All this dissatisfies the masses . . . From last winter, a total of 117,916 households have pulled out at different times from co-operatives in the province. At present, 102,149 households have rejoined."

Suddenly, six weeks after the open forums first started, the Communist rulers called an abrupt halt to the "100 flowers" campaign. It was felt that, instead of 100 flowers, they found 1,000 weeds and, "of course," weeds must be rooted out. The road that had led to those six weeks was a tortuous one. Mao's original speech, "Let 100 flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought contend," which had been delivered as far back as May, 1956, and was intended for intellectuals only, had never been published. Nevertheless the limited freedom expanded itself. China was confronted with student strikes and worker strikes. Meanwhile, the Hungarian "thaw" had developed into a full-scale revolution. Mao still thought he could limit the Chinese thaw by fitting the limited freedoms into the vise of single party domination. Thereupon, (February 27, 1957) he delivered a new speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." He redefined "contradiction" (Mao's favorite thesis) to where both it and freedom lost all meaning. He further redefined "the people" to where they were either "people" or "enemies." Mao put so many limitations to the permissible contradictions that "blooming and contending" was diverted. Even then, however, he felt called upon to introduce so many "additions" to the text of his speech that when it was finally published, on June 18, 1957, "the correct handling of contradictions" soon turned into a relentless hunt for "rightists." The right to free expression ended abruptly, ruthlessly.

Whether this took the form of outright execution, as in the case of the three student leaders at Hanyang, who were hanged before the horrified eyes of 10,000; or whether it took the form of

sending "rightists and intellectuals" to work in the fields, or to serve prison terms, the shock was not exhausted by the typical totalitarian state's crushing of the opposition. Far from retreating in the face of widespread opposition, Mao soon came out with a real brainstorm called "The People's Communes."

3) "The People's Communes"

The first "model Commune" had been initiated in April, 1958 and was named "Sputnik." The name was not chosen accidentally. The October, 1957 Russian launching of the sputnik produced two very different reactions on the part of Khrushchev and Mao. The former knew that Russia's "superiority" over the United States was not "total." He knew, also, the cost of crushing the Hungarian Revolution and bringing the whole of Eastern Europe back under full Russian control. At the same time, the one billion dollars²⁶⁵ in short-term credits to Eastern Europe prevented aid to China in as massive doses as had been previously given it. Above all, the Hungarian Revolution blew sky high, not only Hungary's State Plan, it undermined also Russia's Five Year Plan. This was scrapped and Khrushchev began to think of some substantial trade, on a long-term loan basis, with the United States. Hence, the Manifesto of the ruling Communist parties, in November, 1957, was by no means limited to exorcising "revisionism." It also reaffirmed the line of "peaceful co-existence."

Mao, who was present, thought otherwise. He believed that the sputnik had produced so radical a shift in the world balance of power that the Communist orbit could now undertake little wars, "just wars" and all sorts of adventures with which to taunt U.S. imperialism. While he signed the "unanimous statement," he decided upon a very dramatic departure not only vis-a-vis the United States,²⁶⁶ but a dramatic short-cut to try to outstrip Russian Communism. This illusion of Mao's was fostered by one bountiful harvest, and his vainglorious confidence that he could, by militarizing labor, outstrip science.

What Mao's "People's Communes" far outstripped was Stalin's dictum "to liquidate the kulak as a class." In these "Communes" all the peasants—of China's population of 650 million, no less than

500 million are peasants—were to be herded into barracks-like quarters where they were to function “along military lines,” working from sun-up to sundown. After dinner they were either to attend meetings, or work in fields, or on construction, or in steel “mills”—or wherever they might be ordered to work. Then Mao planned to organize “Communes” in the cities. This total regimentation and militarization of labor was called “mass mobilization,” or “mass line.” This, said Mao, was going to unleash such vast productive forces that they could accomplish in one decade what it took four decades to accomplish in Russia. Moreover, the fantasy went on, they could go, “without interruption,” to Communism.

The totalitarian state was in so great a hurry that in eight months it herded 120 million peasant households—formerly in 740 thousand agricultural producers’ cooperatives of 160 families each—into 24,000 “People’s Communes” each averaging no less than 5,000 families. This, it was claimed, “liberated” tens of millions of women from household chores. They therefore had to work alongside their men in the field full time; their children were taken away from them, and sent to nurseries; old parents were sent to “old peoples’ happy homes.” All eating was done in public mess halls, hence the women who were “freed” from household chores had to cook, instead of for one family, for approximately 8,000.

“The People’s Commune,” read the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee Resolution, “is the combination of industry, agriculture, commerce, education and military affairs within the scope of their activity.”²⁶⁶

Pretentious claims were made that steel was being produced on the farms. Actually only a low-grade of pig iron—full of slag, and quite useless to the steel mills—was produced at the cost of transporting the bulky ore to the farm kilns. In the end, Peking itself had to admit that in 1958 no less than 3.08 million tons of “locally made pig iron” had to be scrapped because it was no good for industrial purposes. Instead of unleashing vast productive forces, all that the “mass line” unleashed were aching backs, and miserable barracks conditions of work and of living. The chaos, disorganization, intolerable living conditions, inhuman relationships, and just plain exhaustion compelled even the totalitarian bureaucracy to call a halt and proclaim benevolently that “ten to twelve hours was

sufficient” to work; that calisthenics and meetings should not take all the rest of the time since “people should sleep eight hours.” The determination persisted for the recognition of personal freedom. Hence, a new dictum: “Members of the Commune are directed to lead a collectivized life. Each person must work ten hours and engage in ideological studies for two hours a day. They are entitled to one day of rest every ten days . . . The CCP committee rules that all members are free to use their time as they wish outside of the ten hours of labor and two hours of ideological study each day; that husband and wife may have a room of their own; that members are permitted to make tea and other refreshments in their own quarters for themselves; and that women members may use their spare time to make shoes and mend clothes . . . The Commune members have enthusiastically welcomed the small personal freedoms granted them by the CCP committee.” (From a New China News Agency report of November 20, 1958).

While the Communes never did develop as the over-all form of production in industry, industry was alleged to have met its production targets “so far ahead of time” that a halt could be called. Once again it was to be recognized that while industry is “the leader” agriculture remains “the basis.” There is no doubt that some progress was made, if the measure of progress is not the way in which people live, but the way industry is developed. Irrigation projects were constructed with forced labor, and the rate of industrial growth far outdistanced that in another Asiatic country—India.

Whatever attraction the fantastic goals set for 1958 had for the underdeveloped countries, if the gullible thought that ordering the masses about like soldiers and making them work endless hours would produce industrialization overnight, if the cynical failed to recoil from the “Communal living” which was short on sex life and love, and long on public mess-halls and work, the present famine conditions compel second thoughts. Here are the figures:²⁶⁷

	First Claims on 1958 Output	Revised Claims on 1958 Output
Steel (million metric tons)	11.08	8.00
Grain (million metric tons)	375.00	250.00
Cotton (million metric tons)	3.32	2.1

No current statistics are released for agriculture.²⁶⁸ It is known, however, that while the word "Commune" is retained, it is actually the production brigade rather than the whole Commune that has become the operational unit. The large production brigade embraces from 200 to 300 families, equivalent to what it was in agricultural producers' co-ops, or a single large village; and the small production brigade consists of only forty families. Again, while the large production brigade has the right of ownership, the small production brigade has the right of use of labor, land, draft animals, and farming tools and equipment.

The "new" method of work follows along the road of the First Five Year Plan modeled on the Russian line, rather than the lines of departure mapped out with "The Great Leap Forward." The blame is placed on those who didn't understand, and thus are in need of yet a new rectification campaign since there are those "who have taken advantage of the difficulties created by natural calamities and shortcomings in basic-level work to carry out destructive activities."

The dictum is: "Reform some comrades who are crudely unconcerned with details, unwilling to understand and often have no idea whatsoever of complete conditions, but yet who direct production." The "new" principle has all the sound of sweated piece-work pay, thus: "The principle of exchange for fair prices, distribution according to work, and work-more-earn-more."²⁶⁹

We must not think, however, that the recognition of a need for technological build-up, or the need to concentrate on agricultural production, or the need for "specialists" and "lowering of production costs" means the abandonment of the Chinese Communist "three-sided banner" that is, socialist construction, the "Great Leap Forward," and the "Commune."

Directed to the Afro-Asian world was the claim that it is possible for the underdeveloped areas to go uninterruptedly from industrialization into "Communism," and that "the mass line" can achieve greater miracles than advanced science.

Khrushchev didn't have to wait two years for the revised figures on the achievements of the "Great Leap Forward" to be published for him to know the preposterousness of the so-called simultaneous development of agriculture and industry in a country that had no

advanced technological base for either. Nor did he appreciate Mao's attempt to transform the fantasy into a "theory" to prove the superiority of the China Road over Russia's more arduous long road to "Communism." The breaking point, however, came, not on the question of the "Commune," but at a time when Mao tried to tell him how to conduct the struggle against the United States. He disregarded Mao's opposition to his meeting with Eisenhower, and arrived in the United States on September 15, 1959. The "spirit of Camp David" for a summit was adhered to until the U-2 spy plane incident in May, 1960. It is true that these considerations of power-politics, and not any theoretical differences, are the basic reasons for the different interpretations from Moscow and Peking on war and revolution. The objective forces that compel the different interpretations are, however, by no means exhausted by pointing to the obvious power-politics involved. Mao's and Khrushchev's "theories" are as objectively founded as are their power politics. It is, therefore, necessary to trace them through to their sources.

B. The Dialectic of Mao's Thought From the Defeat of the 1925-27 Revolution to the Conquest of Power

"... in place of revolt appears arrogance."—Hegel

Different conditions produce different modes of thought. The twenty-two year long struggle for power—from the defeat of the Chinese Revolution of 1925-27 to Mao's assumption of full power in mainland China in 1949—determined the dialectic of "Mao's Thought" as a corollary to Stalin's long series of basic revisions of Marxism which ended in its total transformation into opposite—the monolithic single party state power of totalitarian Communism. To this, and not to Marxism, Mao made two original contributions: (1) the role of the Army, in and out of state power; and (2) "Thought Reform," that is to say, brainwashing which, as the natural adjunct to his "four-class politics," is applied equally to all classes. These are the underlying premises of all of Mao's actions and writings, including the two essays officially cited to prove the

"originality of Mao's Thought as creative Marxism": *On Practice*, and *On Contradiction*. We must never forget that the transformation into opposite is not just an academic question. It is objectively grounded. To grasp the ideology at its source, however, we cannot begin with Mao's conquest of power in 1949, much less with the Sino-Soviet Rift beginning in 1958. Its true beginning is the defeat of the 1925-27 Revolution. Indeed, Mao dates the Chinese Revolution from its defeat because it is then, as he puts it, that the "Revolutionary War" began. In this case we are willing to follow Mao's method of back-dating because it is there that his undermining of Marxism began.

1) Defeat of Revolution

The defeat of the 1925-1927 Chinese Revolution meant the defeat of the peasantry as well as the proletariat. However, where the proletariat could not in any way escape the counter-revolutionary vengeance of Chiang in the cities where his power—state and military, prison and police—was centered, it was possible, in the vast land of China, to find some escape in the mountainous countryside.

Very early during his running from Chiang's endless "extermination campaigns," Mao must have decided that warlordism is no accidental feature of Chinese life, and that "mass power" too should be coordinated with the military. Guerrilla war, and not peasant revolution, was soon made into a theory. The "Red" Army, and not the poor peasants, became the new all-encompassing reality—political as well as military, philosophic as well as economic. The Party armed with military might won support from the peasantry when it took over in a definite piece of territory and fostered agricultural reform. But whether or not it had such wide support, its military control of an area gave the Party state power over the peasantry. This is the quintessential element. Theory can wait.

This is why Mao did not make his only original and moving piece of writing of spontaneous peasant revolt and organization—"Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," February, 1927—into a theory of the role of the peasantry in revolution.²⁷⁰ Mao had no disagreement with Stalin's policy of "The

Bloc of Four Classes," which contributed no small share to the defeat of the Revolution. Despite its revolutionary fervor when it reports the actual revolutionary actions of the peasantry, Mao's Report describes divisions of society as those between "good gentry" and "bad gentry," "corrupt officials" and "honest ones," and speaks of "a new democratic order," not of a social revolution and a new classless society.

The peasant revolts which have characterized the whole of Chinese history since before Christ, deeply characterized, of course, the 1925-27 Revolution. But Mao's "Red Army," which arose after the defeat of the Revolution including the peasantry in Hunan, did not spring from any large scale spontaneous peasant movement. Quite the contrary. "The Red Army had no support from the masses. And in many places it was even attacked like a bandit gang."²⁷¹ When asked whether his Army hadn't included some lumpen-proletariat and even some bandit chiefs, Mao's answer was characteristic, that is to say, practical: They were excellent fighters. The Army was kept disciplined and in action. By the time of Chiang's fourth extermination campaign, it was capable of the historic military feat, the phenomenal long march, which began in October, 1934, into the vastness of China, and stretched over no less than 6,000 miles.

What, however, is forgotten in the oft-telling of this military exploit—I leave aside the decisive role of Chu Teh because it does not change the character of Maoism—is that the long march meant also stops; conquests of villages; acquisition of food supplies by whatever means; and the final method of establishing power when it did set itself up as the supposed "Soviet Republic." The so-called Soviet areas always coincided with the Red Army's sphere of action including the setting up of the "Soviet" from above by the Chinese Communist Party. One thing is clear and indisputable and absolutely new: Never before had a Marxist leader built an Army where there was no mass movement and called the territory of its operation a "Soviet Republic."

The running for safety, the need to survive, the compulsion to protect oneself, was to be elevated into "a theory of revolution." Not only that, every aspect of this survival was so transformed. For example, early in his career, Mao was ruthless against opponents,

more ruthless against revolutionary opponents than he was against Chiang Kai-shek. Thus Li Li-san, who tried to base himself on the urban proletariat and some revolutionary Marxist principles, had to be destroyed. Thus, Mao liquidated the Kiangsi Soviet which, in 1930, tried to base itself on the city. As he himself put it to Edgar Snow, the rebels were "disarmed and liquidated."²⁷² Thereby, Mao completed what the counter-revolutionary Chiang Kai-shek achieved with the defeat of the 1927 Revolution—physical divorce of the Party from the working class.

He repeated this in 1936 as he moved again "to liquidate" Chang Kuo-t'ao²⁷³ who opposed his "peasant Soviets." Mao followed the same policy after his new united front with Chiang in the war against Japan, when he moved against Trotskyists who stood for a "third front" or "Lenin front." Indeed, he branded these as the "principal enemies," which means that fighting against them took priority over fighting either Chiang or Japan.

The struggle against "dogmatists" characterized Mao, in action and in theory, before and after power. We will not get the slightest whiff of fighting "revisionists" until Mao has to fight Khrushchev for power within the Communist world and suddenly finds it necessary to appear "orthodox." The pretense of orthodoxy is strictly limited to the world outside of China. Since the concrete there gives the lie to this claim of orthodoxy, the emphasis is on Mao's "original contributions." Original they truly are. Indeed they have nothing whatever to do with Marxism as was seen over and over again on his road to power. His outflanking of the cities was of one piece with his appeal to the workers, not to revolt, but to continue production, and remain at work while he "took the cities."

Mao's "orthodoxy" has more than a tinge of "originality" since he feels compelled to transform his road to power into a universal theory applicable to all, and especially so to the under-developed countries. Thus, a recent article in *Hongqi* (Red Flag) Number 20-21, 1960, called "A Basic Summing Up of Experience Gained in the Victory of the Chinese People's Revolution," expansively states, over and over again, that the road to power was the establishment of "small revolutionary bases in the rural areas," the moving from

"a few" of these to "many," and thus encircling "the cities by the rural areas (led) to the ultimate taking over of the cities."

And again: "Com. Mao Tse-tung maintained that, above all, the bases in the country which at the beginning were small in area and still few in number should be firmly held and continuously expanded and developed. In this way, it would be possible 'to come ever nearer the goal of attaining nation-wide political power.'"

Mao is not stressing the role of the peasantry as against that of the city workers in order to give the peasantry a special role in the revolution. On the contrary, he denigrates the early peasant Soviets in China, of which he was a leader, but not yet the undisputed leader. Here is how he analyzed that period: "We must by no means allow a recurrence of such ultra-left, erroneous policies as were adopted toward the petty and middle bourgeoisie by our party in the period from 1931 to 1934 (the advocating of un-economically high standards in working conditions; excessively high income-tax rates; . . . the shortsighted, one-sided view of the so-called 'welfare of the toilers' instead of making our objective the development of production, the prosperity of our economy, the taking into account of both public and private interests and benefits of both labor and capital.)"²⁷⁴

Mao launched his new policy by securing Chiang Kai-shek's release after his own Kuomintang subordinates had kidnapped him at Sian in December, 1936. Mao then had Chiang re-instated as head of the united national forces. This is what it meant:

"Our policy is to rely on the poor peasants and maintain a stable alliance with the middle peasants in order to destroy the system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation by the landlord class and the old type of rich peasants. The land, the properties which the landlords and rich peasants receive, must not exceed those which the mass of peasants get. But neither should there be a repetition of the ultra-left, erroneous policy carried out between 1931 and 1934, the so-called policy of 'distribute no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants.' It is necessary to heed the opinion of the middle peasants . . . if they do not agree, concessions should be made to them."²⁷⁵

And again: "We have already adopted a decision not to confiscate the land of the rich peasant . . . we are not confiscating the

property and the factories of the big and small merchants and capitalists. We protect their enterprise . . . The common interests of both capitalists and workers are grounded in the struggle against imperialist aggression . . . What we consider the most important is that all parties and groups should treat us without animosity and bear in mind the objective of the struggle against Japan for salvation of the country. We shall hereafter consider of no importance any difference of opinion on other questions." 276

In a word, Mao "supports" the poor peasant, the revolutionary peasant, like a rope supports a hanging man. Only after the abrogation of the Land Law of the first "Soviet Republic" which had stipulated the confiscation of the land, without compensation, of all landowners above middle peasant—and only after the total disintegration of the proletarian leadership—did Mao finally (1937) become the undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist Party.

He is "for" the peasant when he wants to fight the city worker. He is "for" the poor peasant as he moves against the landlord who opposes him. When he needs the landlords as "part of the nation" that opposes Japan, he promises them their rights, and he even collects their rent for them in this period! The only peasant he is truly for is the peasant *Army*. Of all the Communists in power, only the Chinese list the Army along with the Party as the two instruments of power. Since the attempt to establish Mao as nothing short of "the greatest and most outstanding revolutionary leader, statesman and theorist of Marxism—Leninism in the modern era" begins with establishing him as "the philosopher" who wrote "On Practice," 277 and "On Contradiction," 278 it is to these we turn.

2) The "Philosophy" of the Yen-an Period: Mao Perverts Lenin

"We are opposed to the die-hards in the revolutionary ranks . . . We are opposed to the idle talk of the 'left.'"—Mao Tse-tung.

The drastic change from the first "Soviet" period (1928-34) to the second (Yenan period, 1935-1945) was naturally questioned by

many Communists. When some in his "Red Army" called the merger with the Chiang regular Army "counter-revolutionary," Mao replied that they were "dogmatists." This political struggle underlies the period of Mao's alleged original contribution to the philosophy of Marxism.

Objective research has since cast considerable doubt as to the date (1937) when the essays "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" were written; they weren't published until 1950-52.²⁷⁹ We, however, are willing to accept the official date for their writing at face value because they are objectively, subjectively, for yesteryear and for today, so very Maoist that it does not matter that Mao may have back-dated them to make them appear prescient or re-written them to suit his present style. The point is, in order to sell the policy of class collaboration, Mao evidently thought a frontal attack on "dogmatists" would be insufficient. Hence he chose the form of "Philosophic Essays." These are so filled with empty abstractions that it is difficult to discover either his subject or his aim.

In "On Practice," Mao writes, "The epistemology of dialectical materialism . . . regards human knowledge as being at no point separable from practice." If knowledge is at no point separable from practice, he would have done well to tell us what practice he is talking about. But, no, Mao is anxious to make this reduction of theory to "practicality" appear to be based on nothing less authoritative than Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*. Mao quotes Lenin's sentence, "Practice is more than cognition (theoretical knowledge)." He fails to tell us, however, that Lenin was only restating Hegel's analysis of the relationship of the Practical Idea to the Theoretical Idea before the two are united, as Lenin puts it, "precisely in the theory of knowledge."

Far from theory being reduced to "practicality," Lenin asserts, in the very section from which Mao quoted one sentence, the following: "Alias: Man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it." Since this preceded the quotation Mao used, it would have seemed impossible for even a Confucian like Mao so totally to have misunderstood its meaning—unless, of course, he had set out deliberately to pervert Lenin. In any case, the world the sophist Mao created was for such a low purpose—to compel

obedience to a new united front with Chiang—that one hesitates to dignify the writing as “philosophy.”

Only because this state-capitalist tyrant rules over no less than 650 million souls is one compelled to attempt an analysis of his “original contribution to Marxism.”

Evidently, Mao failed to convince his hearers or his readers (we are not told which) because he soon followed with still another “philosophical essay,” once again directed against the dogmatists,” and this time called “On Contradiction.” We are told that it was delivered as a lecture at the anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yen-an, August, 1937.

In “On Contradiction” Mao used some “practical” examples. This has at least one virtue: it shows exactly how he has to rewrite his own previous period of rule in order “to balance” the mistakes of “dogmatists” against those of the Kuomintang. It turns out that only “after 1927 (my emphasis—R.D.), the Kuomintang turned in the opposite direction” from the “revolutionary and vigorous” period of united front in 1925. The defeat of the Chinese Revolution is now laid at the door of “Ch’en Tuh-siuism,” that is to say, the revolutionary Trotskyist leader, Ch’en Tuh-siu! Even the loss of “Soviet China” (now called merely “revolutionary bases”) is blamed, not on Chiang’s extermination campaigns, but on the “mistakes of adventurism.”

“Since 1935,” Mao pompously continues amidst a great deal of pretentious phrasemongering on the philosophic meaning of “Contradictions,” “it (the Communist Party) has rectified these mistakes and led the new anti-Japanese united front.” It follows that after “the Sian Incident in December, 1936, it (the Kuomintang) made another turn,” obviously in the “right revolutionary direction” since they are once again in a united front. In “On Contradiction,” this demagogic class collaborationist says benignly, “We Chinese often say: ‘Things opposed to each other complement each other.’”

So permeated to the marrow of his bones is Mao with Confucianism that it is doubtful he is even conscious that he is thereby perverting in toto the Hegelian-Marxian theory of development through contradiction. Seen in all its profundity for the first time by Lenin, in 1915, as he re-read and commented upon Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, this development through contradiction, trans-

formation into opposite, helped Lenin get to the root of the collapse of established Marxism, the Second International. Blind to the developing oppositions, contradictions, antagonisms, Mao on the other hand invented a “truly original” division in the concept of contradiction, which he called “Principal Aspect of the Contradiction.” This division between “the principal contradiction” and “the principal aspect of contradiction” permits Mao to make as complete a hash of philosophy as he has previously made of history. Thus it turns out that under certain conditions, “even principal contradictions are relegated temporarily to a secondary, or subordinate, position” and because of “uneven developments” and “mutual transformations,” the economic basis becomes “subordinated” while “political and cultural reforms become the principal and decisive factors.” Trying to make up for this insipid subjectivism, Mao proceeds to tell his readers that Communists “of course” remain materialists since “as a whole,” they see that “material things determine spiritual things . . .” All one can say of such a hodge-podge is what Kant said of “the cosmological proof,” that it was “a perfect nest of thoughtless contradictions.”

A recent traveler to China cited what a local party secretary from Shensi said: “Through the study of theory, I clearly understood the principles of uninterrupted revolution and of revolution by stages and put them into concrete application in pig breeding.”²⁸⁰ Senseless as the local party secretary’s statement is, it is only the logical conclusion of “The Leader’s” reduction of theory to “practice” compelling the Chinese to follow his dictum that “dogmas are more useless than cow dung.”

Before, however, we flee in disgust from the vulgarities that pass for “philosophy,” and become too anxious to dismiss what totalitarian China lovingly calls “Mao’s thought,” let us bear in mind his present power. Let us remember, also, that when Mao made the Chinese Communist Party accept the new united front with Chiang and initiated his “three-thirds” principle—that one-third Communist Party members, one-third Kuomintang, and one-third non-party people constitute the administration in Communist areas—the fight against Japan stiffened. This was the period when visiting foreign journalists, whose cultural standards were greater than those of Mao’s cohorts, were impressed with his “exciting

speeches on culture." Wearing of the Kuomintang corruption and its ineffectualness in fighting Japan, they were impressed by the Communists, not only in the fight against Japan, but in the dedication "to go to the people," i.e., to establish schools among the peasants in remote areas, and proceed with agricultural reforms. Still others, including many of the bourgeoisie and landlords, were attracted by the moderate agricultural program, and hence, many anti-Communists began accepting the Chinese Communists as mere "agrarian reformers." Mao contributed nothing to Marxian philosophy, and denuded its politics of its class content. But he certainly carved out an original road to power. It is this which we must look at again from still another aspect which he calls "three magic weapons."

3) "Three Magic Weapons"

Stalin's rationalization for transforming the workers' state into a state-capitalist society was called "building socialism in one country." It was based on the supposition that this could be done if only Russia were not attacked from the outside. To assure this Stalin transformed the world Communist movements into outposts for Russia's defense. He allotted them no independent class role to play. In the case of China it resulted in the elaboration of "the bloc of four classes" which effectively subordinated the Chinese Communist Party to the Kuomintang which helped defeat the 1925-1927 Revolution. The "bloc of four classes," renamed the policy of the "united front," became the warp and woof of Mao's thoughts and actions both as he strove for power and after he achieved it.

What Stalin had used for the outside, Mao applied inside China. Mao is a positivist. He is positively "magical" in seeing "positive" elements in all classes. It stood him in good stead on the road to power; and when he achieved it, he proceeded to liquidate "the bureaucrat capitalists" not the capitalists as a class; the "bad gentry" and not the landlord as a class. He feels positive he can "remold" the capitalists and landlords mentally. This is where his "rectification campaigns" differ from Stalin's purges: he is so blind to the actualities of the class divisions tugging at his rule that he believes in "a world of Great Harmony," where all contradictions, of course, "complement each other."

A recent article from Hongqi²⁸¹—"The United Front—A Magic Weapon of the Chinese People for Winning Victory"—sheds more light on the united front as the actual "philosophy" of the de-classed concept of "contradiction." Truly it is "the magic weapon" by which Mao swears throughout his development, in and out of power. As Mao made it the very warp and woof of existence and thought in 1937, the recent article from the fortnightly of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party extends its existence to the present day. It was "the magic weapon" after he consolidated power in mainland China and, in 1952, when Mao began his three "antis" campaign—anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratism. It continued into the later campaign of the five "antis"—anti-bribery, anti-tax evasion, anti-theft of state property, anti-cheating on government contracts, and anti-stealing of economic information for private speculation. So much for the period in which he tried to break the back of the private capitalists and landlords whom he brought with him from the anti-Japanese war, and as he laid the basis for state-capitalism in the economic foundation as well as in the political structure.

He then had to increase his campaign against the proletariat and peasantry and intellectuals who still thought this meant a move to socialism. The "rectification campaign of 1957-1958" is not accidentally launched under the same "philosophic" banner of 1937, only this time "On Contradiction" gets extended to "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." Simultaneously, the vise of the single party state rule is clamped on the "100 schools of thought contending."

A perennial mathematician of sorts, Mao had, "as early as 1939, on the basis of the rich historical experience of the Party over a period of 18 years," expanded the single magic weapon into "three magic weapons":²⁸² "the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental problems of the Chinese Communist Party's three magic weapons, its three principal magic weapons, for defeating the enemy in the Chinese Revolution."

Since he is supposed to be a Marxist revolutionary, this leader "of the bloc of four classes," having state power in addition to these "three magic weapons" of "the united front, armed struggle and Party-building," remembers that he is supposed to stand for pro-

letarian revolution and the rule of the proletariat. To a man in command of "magic weapons" this obligation presents no problems. "The people's democratic dictatorship" in China, says Mao, functions indeed "under the leadership of the working class." How? To the Chairman of the Communist Party, the one and only ruling party in China, it is all as simple as jumping through a hoop: the proletariat lives "through the Communist Party." Mao makes it easy indeed as he moves to sum up and reduce the "three magic weapons" into the single omnipresent one: "To sum up our experiences and concentrate it into one point, it is: the people's dictatorship under the leadership of the workingclass (through the Communist Party) and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants." 283

For one ready, with one great leap, to go directly to "communism," he cannot, needless to say, stop long at this "alliance of workers and peasants" before he jumps into the "world of Great Harmony": "Bourgeois democracy has given way to people's democracy under the leadership of the working class, and the bourgeois republic to the people's republic. This has made it possible to achieve socialism and communism through the people's republic, to abolish classes and enter a world of Great Harmony." 284

C. *Oriental Despotism, Brainwashing—Or the Economic Compulsion Of State-Capitalism*

In contrast to the panegyrics from Chinese Communist sources, scholars are once again reviving the appellation of *Oriental Despotism*.²⁸⁵ A good dose of this thesis has even affected one Marxist who made an original study of *Mao's China*, correctly designating it as a state-capitalist society.²⁸⁶ There is so much war-lordism in Mao; so solid a substratum of Chinese nationalism underlies his revision of Marxism; so thoroughly saturated with Confucianism is "Mao's Thought"—and the state-capitalist society he established is so great a tyranny—that it is all too easy to arrive at such a seemingly logical conclusion as "Oriental Despotism." That nothing quite misses the mark by so great a margin is obvious from the total overhaul of Chinese society, its family life as well as its industry, its ruling ideology as well as its agriculture.

Neither Chinese economic development nor the Sino-Soviet dispute is greatly illuminated by harking back to the past of any alleged continuous development called "Oriental Despotism." At the same time the fact that Mao's China is vying also with India for influence in the Afro-Asian and Latin American worlds compels a second look both at the ideology and economics of present-day China.

1) *In Agriculture*

The victory of Mao is not rooted in some sort of unchanging Oriental despotism resting on a static agricultural mode of production. The very opposite is true. There have been so many changes in the agricultural pattern of China in the single decade of Mao's rule that it looks as if there were no points of "equilibrium" at all. The fact, however, is that it is the state-capitalist structure which keeps it from collapsing now in its period of crisis, and underlies all agricultural changes from the first land reform, upon gaining power, until the "People's Commune."

Thus, the land redistribution of the period from 1950 to 1953 left a mere three million peasants unaffected. To say that this gave the land to the peasants would be the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the perpetually betrayed poor peasants. The redistribution made the average land-holding per capita something under 2 mou (1/6th of an acre equals 1 mou). The redistribution did eliminate 20 million landowners; it is estimated that no less than five million were killed. Obviously there weren't as many as five million top capitalists and landlords in the exploitative class. The pattern of Mao's ridding China of revolutionary opposition, as well as "counter-revolutionaries," has been to brand all opposition as "bureaucrat capitalist" or "rich landlord" or "rightist." This stood him in good stead for it allowed hundreds of thousands to be sentenced to forced labor and sent to build roads and irrigation projects.²⁸⁷ At the same time, enough "bad gentry" and capitalists were liquidated to assure full state power to the Communist Party, which had come to power with their help. And enable it to turn against the peasants who had been granted 2 mou but could not possibly eke out a living from it.

The first period of cooperatives proceeded, however, at a slow pace, with peasants being encouraged to form mutual aid teams and small cooperatives. By 1955, the tempo had quickened to such an extent that no less than 96 per cent of the peasant households were reported as organized in cooperatives. The peasants were permitted to have "ownership" of their lands, private property was allowed, and they could work 10 per cent of their land for themselves. This was the period when high increases in production were attained, and when the bountiful harvest created the foundation for Mao's brainstorm about the formation of "People's Communes."

Instead of "the Great Leap Forward," we know the results of this 1958 phantasmagoria, dealt with above. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss the impact on the non-industrialized world of what the Chinese totalitarian rulers called the "uninterrupted revolution"—"a revolution without pause" that, moreover, can be accomplished, without high technology, by the mere application of a "mass line."

As *Hongqi* recently put it:²⁸⁸ "Before it was possible to equip agriculture with machinery it was possible to develop agricultural and productive forces and thereby promote the development of industry." Not in any way deterred by thus standing matters upside down, our Chinese theoretician proceeds to develop the concept of "simultaneity" as the new basis of "the worker-peasant alliance": "That basis is, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out, 'simultaneously, gradually, to bring about on the one hand, socialist industrialization and socialist transformation of handicraft industry and capitalist industry, and commerce, and, on the other, the socialist transformation of agriculture as a whole through cooperation. In that way we shall . . . let all people in the rural areas enjoy a common prosperity.'" ²⁸⁹

It is obvious that "prosperity" has become famine, but what has this to do with Oriental despotism? Far from an Oriental despotic ring, it has a most modern ring which lends it appeal to overpopulated Asia and underpopulated Africa.

2) Military and Industrial

Nor is Mao's victory accountable solely to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's regime was so corrupt and discredited that it literally fell apart by itself. Although that certainly helped Mao's Army achieve power, we fly in the face of the facts of Mao's military exploit in the "Long March," as well as the organization needed for bare existence for two decades in isolation from all urban centers, if we limit Mao's victory to Chiang's ineffectuality. Mao's rule, no doubt, has its roots in old China, both its magnificence and its corruption, its war lords and Mandarins. What needs analysis, however, are the distinguishing marks which set off one epoch from another, not the similarities which blur what is new, what is of our age.

Our age is the age of state-capitalism, national revolutions and workers' revolts. Unless one is ready to base himself on the masses who alone can initiate a truly new social order, one has no place to go but to state-capitalism. This is so not only irrespective of personal traits but even of the basic factor that China is overwhelmingly agricultural. Insofar as China is concerned, industrialization has come so late on the stage that, either a new human basis will be laid for it, or the exploitative industrial form will need to go via state-capitalism. The very occupation and industrialization of Manchuria by Japan, for example, meant that a great deal of industry became "ownerless" once China regained its independence. Even Chiang Kai-shek recognized what would next have to be done: "We must adopt a planned economy," he wrote in 1943 in his *China's Destiny*. "It is imperative that we eventually accomplish the objective of 'transforming' capital into state capital." The minute Mao consolidated his power in mainland China, this is precisely what he embarked on—statification of industry. And, it needs to be added, with the same method of exploitation of the masses as Chiang or any other capitalist would have followed.

The First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) began with substantial aid from the Soviet Union, mainly in the form of 156 complete projects and key industries—iron and steel plants, oil refineries, chemical works, power plants. For the first time state ownership was fully established, and the workers were forever admonished

about "production and more production." This part didn't change from the May Day slogans of 1950 when he allowed private capitalists to function: "Members of the Chinese working class! Consolidate your ranks and unite with the national bourgeoisie." Just as, in 1947, he stressed that he was "for both labor and capital," "reasonable profits" were greatly encouraged, first for private capital, and now for the State. The five "antis" campaign was launched as the capitalists amassed too much profit—and the "rectification campaigns" proceeded apace when the workers struck against inhuman working conditions, whether that was 12 hours of labor, or lack of any freedom in their personal lives. The State moved from joint private and state enterprises which it had called state-capitalist to "socialism," that is to say, real state-capitalism. The appeal to the capitalists to remain managers of business did not stop. Thus: "If you do a really good job in developing your business, and train your children to be first-class technical experts, you will be the obvious people to put in charge of the nationalized enterprise and you may find that you earn more as managers of a socialist enterprise than as mere owners." No doubt many of them have become managers of industry.

The workers were forbidden to strike. The trade unions were made into pure organs of disciplining the workers and seeing that production plans were carried out. Forced labor was a regular feature of Chinese state-capitalism calling itself Communism. It is not in this that it differs from its Russian model. It does differ in its concept of "thought reform."

3) *Brainwashing*

Brainwashing, as a word coined in the Korean War to denote either forced or genuine changing of sides on the part of American soldiers joining the Chinese, gives the appearance of yet one more form of the confessionals made so famous during the infamous Moscow Frame-Up Trials. No doubt there is much of that in them. What is new in Mao's perennial "rectification campaigns" is that they are neither limited to the "foreigner" or "enemy," nor meant as a purge limited to members of the Party. No. Mao has raised the concept of "thought reform" both to a philosophic category and a veritable way of life.

While he has not succeeded in brainwashing the Chinese, he has succeeded in brainwashing certain liberals outside of China who take this belief in thought reform to mean that there is no violence against the people. Contrary to Stalin, these believers in Mao's order maintain that Mao has not killed "the general staff of the revolution." As "proof" they point to the fact that those in command are the very ones who led the "Revolution." This crude misconception conveniently forgets that, with the defeat of the 1925-1927 Revolution, Chiang Kai-shek did for Mao what Stalin had to do for himself—kill or imprison the revolutionaries, including Ch'en Tu-hsui. This is first of all, but not all. For even in those years when Mao did not have full power, he was ruthless against revolutionary opponents. We saw this in 1930 when the workers under Li Li-san attacked Changsha and held the city for a few days, whereupon Mao "disarmed and liquidated the rebels." This was repeated in 1936 with Chang Kuo-t'ao. And again during the war with Japan when he "liquidated" the Third Front. There were no Trials comparable to the Moscow Trials after Mao Tse-tung gained power in mainland China only because the "general staff of revolutionary war" were those who followed his class collaborationist path to power, and state-capitalist rule in power.

The one grain of truth in the apologia is that Mao believes in "thought reform." However, this is not for the reasons the apologists give. No, it is for the needs of a state-capitalism that must be developed in an overwhelmingly agricultural land, and therefore wishes to convince part of the capitalist and landlord class to remain as managers of the state economy in the hope of obviating the inevitability of proletarian revolution.

The most amazing feat of brainwashing is neither that made famous in Korea among American soldiers, nor that within China once power was achieved. The phenomenal aspect is that achieved among intellectuals who do not have state power and are supposedly giving their lives to achieving workers' power; in a word, the petty-bourgeois Marxist intellectual. The inescapable fact is that in this epoch of state-capitalism the middle class intellectual, as a world phenomenon, has translated "individualism" into "collectivism," by which he means nationalized property, state administration, State Plan. The post-war years gave this phenomenon the appearance of

a new emanation from the under-developed countries. In actuality, the only thing that distinguishes the brain-washers from the capitalistic Brain Trust of the New Deal days is that their master, Mao Tse-tung, was once a Marxist revolutionary himself and is adept in the use of Marxist terminology. This now has expanded itself into a challenge to Khrushchev, or more precisely, Russia's leadership of world Communism. The fact that Mao has also captured the non-existent imagination of the Trotskyists who, despite Trotsky's historic and theoretic fight against Mao, have all become "Maoists" to an embarrassing degree is only further proof of the administrative mentality of the intellectuals in a state-capitalist age who have made such a fetish of the State Plan that they, literally, are begging to be intellectually raped.²⁹⁰ They do not even flinch in the face of a possibility of thermonuclear war so long as they will die for the right "principles." We must, therefore, analyze further the Sino-Soviet conflict. In doing this let us not forget that which the "left" Communist splits, East and West, disregard with such bohemian abandon: the power politics behind the conflict.

*D. CAN There Be War Between Russia and China?:
The Non-Viability of State-Capitalism*

1) 1960-62: Preliminary Sparring

In 1960 China took advantage of the 90th anniversary of the birth of Lenin (April 22) to transform the power conflict into a "theory of revolution." It was called "Long Live Leninism," and appeared as an "Editorial" in *Red Flag*, No. 8, 1960 (translated in the *Peking Review*, No. 17, 1960).

This "Editorial" is a full-sized pamphlet of some 40 pages. It is heavily sprinkled with quotations from Lenin, which stress proletarian revolution. While the editorial itself plays down "modern science" (that is, ICBM's, H-bombs, and sputniks) as mere "specific details of technical progress in the present-day world," it unleashes an attack on "modern revisionism" in a way that makes it very easy to read "Khrushchev" where the editorial says "Tito." Since all the proofs of the war-like nature of the United States are drawn from the period *after* Khrushchev's visit with Eisenhower,

it is easy to see that "the inevitability of war" is, in truth, not a question of Lenin's theory, but is specifically directed against Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence.

Khrushchev correctly judged that lengthy editorial on Lenin as a new stage, not merely in "Mao's Thought," but in Mao's ambitions for leadership in the Communist orbit, in influence over the underdeveloped areas, and in planning the strategy of any war with the United States. It is rumored that a discussion between Russia and China regarding a joint Pacific Fleet was cancelled by Khrushchev for fear that Mao would push him into a war over the Formosa Straits.²⁹¹ The "Editorial," however, was a still-birth. The May 1, U.S. U-2 spy plane over Russia made it so. It also gave Khrushchev the opportunity he needed not only to break up the summit conference he had heretofore planned, but also to convoke an international conference of the Communist world to discipline Mao. Khrushchev's appearance at the UN was part of the preparation for this conference. In the well known shoe-pounding incident at the UN Khrushchev got his opportunity to announce to the whole world that he is not only master of the Communist world, but the only hope of the new world opened up by the African Revolutions.

On Dec. 7, 1960, Khrushchev convened the 81 Communist Parties for a conference in Moscow.²⁹² There he transformed his UN speech into the new Communist Manifesto which declared Russia to be "the first country in history to be blazing a trail to communism for all mankind." The overwhelming majority of the Communist Parties present in Moscow demanded Mao sign the Declaration so that a "unanimous" Communist front be shown American imperialism. Mao could not refuse to do so without exposing the fact that China considered Russia to be the enemy. Mao signed, but continued his independent road not only in China but throughout the third Afro-Asian-Latin American world.

China's signature to the 1960 Moscow Manifesto did not stop its deviationary road along its own national interests any more than France's signature to NATO stopped De Gaulle from seeking his own glory road. The post-war world of the 1960's, is, after all, a very different world from what it was in the late 1940's when both Europe and China lay in ruins, and each had to accept aid and,

with it, the "philosophy" underlying the Marshall Plan and the Warsaw Pact respectively. Mao is trying to do with a barrage of revolutionary phrases what De Gaulle is trying to achieve with spoutings about "French grandeur." In both cases, however, the split within their respective orbits is due to national ambitions for world expansion.

The initiative, however, had returned into Khrushchev's hands after the U-2 spy plane discovery. He used it to isolate China further. In 1961 the Draft Program for the 22nd Russian Communist Party Congress relegates the Chinese Revolution to the total of 11 words. This was done, not because it is the program of a national party, the Russian, but because Russia as a world phenomenon began the 20th century with the 1917 Revolution as a new epoch and continued it with the 1957 Sputnik which outdistanced even the United States. Moreover, Khrushchev insisted, this Russian age is not only different as against the United States, but as distinct from China, because the Russians are "building Communism."²⁹³ No wonder Khrushchev at the Congress itself chose to attack Albania (meaning China) and Chou En-lai chose to walk out after defending Albania (meaning China), and challenging Russia's right to bring such disputes into the open without "prior consultation" with the Communist world. These attacks and defenses are as counterfeit as the "theories" in which Mao and Khrushchev wrap themselves as they carry on their bitter competition.

The October 22, 1962 confrontation of J. F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev over missiles in Cuba, the historic moment when the whole world held its breath for fear of nuclear holocaust, gave Mao Tse-tung the opportunity to regain the initiative in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The moment Khrushchev backed down when Kennedy made it clear he was ready to plunge the world into nuclear war unless Khrushchev removed those missiles from Cuba, Mao launched the new stage of conflict by accusing Khrushchev of "cowardice in the face of imperialism." Then he moved to take over "leadership" of the "socialist world" by demanding that it come to his support in the Sino-Indian war.

2) *New Dateline: Peking, June 14, 1963: "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement"*²⁹⁴

The new, the qualitative difference in the Sino-Soviet conflict crystallized into an open challenge theoretically as well. It took the form of a "letter" of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC of the CPC) to its Russian counterpart, dated June 14, 1963, and entitled "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement." Soon thereafter it was published as a pamphlet in a dozen different languages of East and West.

China's industrial development may lack everything from steel to dams and atomic energy. Its Army, however, has everything from overwhelming numbers to military equipment. In the first instance, it is the largest land army in the whole world, and in the second instance it has the most modern equipment on the Asian continent. Russian humor may have pinpointed Mao's historic image when it says history will record him "as an athletic failure in the broad jump." But he was no failure in the Sino-Indian War. As "Mao's Thought" thrives on military engagements, it has given birth to yet a new crop of "theories." These are developed with much subterfuge and great wordiness in the 61-page June 14th "letter." They add up to a single and total ambition for world mastery.

In five different ways the June 14th "letter" states that "the touchstone of internationalism" (p. 10) should no longer be the defense of Russia. The first reason given for the new thesis is that the defense of the Soviet Union was originally the touchstone of internationalism because it was the only "socialist country" but "Now that there is a socialist camp of thirteen countries" the whole "socialist world" has become that "touchstone of internationalism." "Therefore," reads the second point of indictment against Russia, referred to as "anybody": "If anybody . . . helps capitalist countries attack fraternal socialist countries, then he is betraying the interests of the entire international proletariat and the people of the world." (p. 10) The accusation of betrayal is obviously aimed at Russia for its failure to support China's invasion of India. The third variation of "Russia no longer" is an appeal for adherents

within the country under attack since the "step back in the course of historic development" is declared to be tantamount to "doing a service to the restoration of capitalism." Yugoslavia is named as the culprit but, clearly, Russia is meant.

The Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is now prepared for the big jump, the shift from proletarian revolutions to national struggles "since" the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are "the storm centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism." (p. 12) "In a sense, therefore, the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggle of the people in these areas . . ." (p. 13)

This shift of pivot—the fourth variation on the theme, "Russia no longer"—is supposed to be based on Lenin's thesis (at the Second Congress of the Communist International, 1920) about the imperative duty of the proletariat of the technologically advanced countries to unite with the peasant masses in the colonial countries struggling to free themselves from imperialism. Lenin's new point of departure in the theory of non-inevitability of capitalist development for backward economies is based on a big "if": *if* "aid of the proletariat of the most advanced countries" is extended unstintingly. Lenin stresses that the only proof of proletarian internationalism, therefore, is for the Russian proletariat to extend this aid along with the theory and practice of revolution. All of this is reduced by Mao to a matter of his competition with Khrushchev as to who will "lead" this new, third world. In the process, Mao moves away from his concept of the division of the world into two camps, "the socialist countries" against "the capitalist countries." Although he had taken great pains to bring this concept in as a substitute for the class struggle in each country, he now disregards it. In order to reintroduce his old, ruinous "four class policy" he broadens the concept of "the people" to include "also the patriotic national bourgeoisie, and even certain kings, princes, and aristocrats who are patriotic." (p. 15)

By the time Chinese Communism reaches the fifth and final theme of its international manifesto of "never, no, never again Russia"—this time directed against Russia being "a state of the whole people building communism"—we are suddenly confronted

with the most sinister of all theories of retrogression. Over and over again "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist World" proclaims that "for a very long historic period after the proletariat takes power" (p. 36); "for decades or even longer after socialist industrialization and agricultural collectivization" (p. 37) have been achieved, "the class struggle continues as an objective law independent of man's will." (p. 36) This holds true in all "socialist countries." Now whatever the subjective impulse for concocting this—all too transparently it is meant to lay the foundation for opposition to the 22nd Russian Communist Party Congress which enunciated that Russia was "building Communism"—it is the most serious of all theories of retrogression. We now have not only the retrogression of capitalism to fascism, but the retrogression of socialism, that is to say, a supposedly classless society, to one in which "there are classes and class struggles in all socialist countries without exception." (p. 40) Surely no more deadly deviation has ever been proclaimed "a principle of Marxism-Leninism."

Where the tiny state power of Yugoslavia, in 1948, when it fought the giant, Russia, for national independence, could not allow itself any new glory roads a la De Gaulle in the Western camp, Mao's delusions are as vast as the Chinese continent—and not only as it is now constituted, but as it was at the height of its imperial glory under the Yuan and Ming Dynasties when China conquered Burma, Thailand, Indochina Peninsula, debarked troops to Indonesia, imprisoned the king of Ceylon and once even imposed annual tribute from the Moslem world or at least from the Holy City of Mecca. Before 1962 only Nehru had questioned the map included in "A Manual of History" which was published in Peking in 1954.²⁹⁵ This shows a great part of the Soviet Far East as well as the Republic of Outer Mongolia, North and South Korea, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, Assam (about 50,000 miles of Indian territory, in fact), Butan, Sikkim, Nepal, the island of Sakhalin as well as some islands in the Philippines, as having been part of China.

When, in 1962, Khrushchev dared to quip at Mao's phrase about "cowardice in the face of the imperialists" by saying it ill-behooves Mao to speak so when he is doing nothing presently to

drive the imperialists from "his own territory—Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao," the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* hit back with: "Certain persons would like us to raise the questions of unequal treaties here and now . . . Have they realized what the consequences of this might be?" Whereupon the Chinese began explaining "the imperialist encroachments on Chinese territory (1840-1919). Period of the Early Democratic Revolution." And, in expanding themselves on what Tsarist Russia took from "old China," the present Chinese rulers included territories taken from Emirs and Khans who most assuredly did not consider themselves vassals of the Emperor of China. (Nor, for that matter, did Mao's dream of China's past glories stop itself from designating as an "imperialist encroachment" Thailand's becoming independent; that too "belonged" to China of the Emperor and he means "to redress" some day the borders of what the CC-CPC designates only as "old China.")

Mao opts for nothing short of mastery of the world, of the Communist world to begin with. Though, for tactical reasons, and because of the withdrawal of Russian technical aid, China had to fall back on a variation of "the theory of socialism in one country" ("Every socialist country must rely mainly on itself for its construction." p. 45), the CC-CPC challenges not only Russia but the majority of the presently constituted Communist world. It warns that "one should not emphasize 'who is in the majority' or 'who is in the minority' and bank on a so-called majority . . ." (p. 47). In the place of following majority rule, he proposes the rule of "unanimity," that is to say, China's right of veto over policies formulated by Russia and the majority of other Communist Parties. Thus, the present Sino-Soviet conflict differs fundamentally not only from Yugoslavia's 1948 conflict with Stalin for national independence, but also from Mao's own differences both in 1957 and in 1960 when the conflict could be hushed up because it was fought within the Communist world.

The one and only thing that both Khrushchev and Mao prove, the one and only thing that is beyond the peradventure of any doubt is the non-viability of their "new" social order. *The non-viability of state-capitalism as a "new" social order is proven by the same laws of development as that of private capitalism, that is to*

say, the compulsion to exploit the masses at home and to carry on wars abroad. A shocking question faces us now: *Can there be a war between two regimes calling themselves Communist?*

1) *Back to "Wars and Revolutions":
Russia and China At War?*

The challenge to totalitarian power that was issued by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 brought Russia and China closer together than they had ever been, either in Stalin's era or in Malenkov-Khrushchev's times. The class content of the counter-revolutionary crushing of the proletarian revolution is crucial to all else that has happened since. Directly after the show of solidarity with Russian imperialism against the Hungarian revolutionaries, China, as we saw, moved toward expanding its own state power.

Despite De Gaulle's derisive question, "The ideological split? Over what ideology?" his display of arrogance at his news conference on July 29, 1963, could not clothe his nuclear ambition as Mao does his. Its death features stood out in all their goriness: "France will not be diverted by Moscow agreements from equipping herself with the means of immeasurable destruction possessed by other powers." By contrast, Mao was enabled to exorcise Khrushchev for "servilely meeting the needs of United States imperialism" by his agreement to a treaty which "undertakes . . . to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere . . ." This, said Mao, means "out and out betrayal" of "the socialist countries and all oppressed countries" since it would keep them "from acquiring nuclear weapons" while consolidating the United States' "position of nuclear monopoly." The superiority of arguments, carefully clothed in Marxist garb, however, cannot be maintained when both contestants are so clothed.

For the time being no war is in the offing between Russia and China. From Russia's side, this would make no sense not only because it is the "have" nation, but also because it certainly would break up the international Communist movement that still considers the State Plan as a fundamental division between itself and

"the bourgeoisie." From China's side, such a war would be suicidal not only because Mao isn't strong enough to challenge the Russian goliath, but also because he is a firm believer in the infamous Dulles policy of negotiating from "positions of strength." Those he will not have unless he first wins to his side both the West European and the Asian Communist Parties which are in power (North Korea, North Viet Nam), and also the African non-Communist world—or that of Latin America.

Moreover this struggle between state-capitalist powers is taking place in a nuclear age. Because the opposition of all the peoples of the world to nuclear war is total Khrushchev would like nothing better than to reduce all his differences with Mao to a disagreement on "peaceful co-existence." As *Izvestia* put it, Russia was not surprised that militarist, reactionary forces in the West were "atom mongers and madmen," but it was most "sadly" surprised to find that the "Chinese comrades should join their voices to the screams of those madmen." Indeed, so total is the opposition to nuclear war that the only two countries which dared openly oppose the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—Mao's China and De Gaulle's France—had to claim that they did so "in the name of peace." Mao went so far as to offer counter-proposals for nothing short of "complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons." That did not prevent him from attacking the actual treaty not only as "a big fraud" and "betrayal of the Soviet people," but also as an exposure of "the servile features of those who warmly embrace imperialism. The exposure," he said, "of these freaks and monsters in their true colors is an excellent thing for the revolutionary struggle of the peoples and the cause of world peace." (*People's Daily*, Aug. 2) Mao, indeed, is no less scared of a nuclear holocaust than the rest of the world. But he does not allow the question mark this puts over the very survival of civilization to divert him from his feeling that this time the "have" nations—the United States and Russia—will first of all eliminate each other!

There is no doubt that China expounds a global strategy basically different from that of Russia. It alone has the audacity to speak of a time to follow a nuclear war when "socialism will be built on its ruins." Nevertheless, this is not the point in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Nor is that divisive and decisive point to be found

In China's recent attempts to exclude Russia from Asian and African meetings on racial grounds. Both points are only the culmination of something that began as Mao strove for power. It had been obvious in all Mao's fights with Stalin and as soon as the Chinese Communist Party took power it demanded that "Mao's 'Thought'" become the underlying theory for all conquests of power in "colonial countries."

This theme was muted during the Korean War of 1950-53 and again in the "joint" Khrushchev-Mao 1957 Manifesto against the proliferation of polycentrism. Naturally, every ruling class has found it easy to support revolutions—abroad. But, whereas new ruling classes, when they first come on the historic scene, proved themselves full of vitality because they did have a wider support among the masses than the old ruling classes they overthrew, the State Planners of today feel compelled to embark on wars before ever they have proved their right to historic existence on native soil.

Wars and revolutions are not synonymous. They are opposites. Here, then, are the actual consequences of Mao's revolutionary thunder since he won power against Stalin's advice to maintain his coalition with Chiang Kai-shek: 1) China embarks on wars only when it is sure to win, as against Tibet first, and limited to incursions into borders of India now; 2) When it suits its purpose, China peacefully, or, more correctly, shrewdly "co-exists" with European imperialist outposts on its own territory, like Hong Kong and Macao; 3) If Mao, whose "Thought" could exude nothing more original than "a four-class policy," is nevertheless more adept than Khrushchev in the use of Marxist terminology to hide his territorial ambitions, he is no "braver" in facing a challenge from the greatest military power in the world—the United States. Mao has backed down more times, not only on Taiwan, but on Quemoy and Matsu, than did Khrushchev when he saw that Kennedy was actually ready to go to nuclear war over missiles in Cuba; 4) Despite his revolutionary thunder, in the abstract, Mao is, in the concrete, an expert in imperialist maneuvering and in dubbing even "fascist regimes" as "peace-loving." Thus, before the Sino-Indian war, Mao called the military regime in Pakistan "fascist," but the moment China was engaged in war with India, Mao lost no time in making a deal

with Pakistan which had suddenly become a "peace-loving nation"; 5) Nor does his "revolutionary defense" of the Afro-Asian world he hopes one day to dominate keep him from excluding other Communist lands whom he calls "revisionist" while including, as we saw, "the national bourgeoisie, and even certain kings, princes, and aristocrats who are patriotic."

The odd mixture of Mao's opportunism and adventurism, the ordinary imperialist power struggle (both within the Communist world and outside, as in the conquest of Tibet, incursions into Indian territory, and covetous glances cast from Burma to Viet Nam, and from Nepal to Laos) cannot be separated from the struggle for the minds of men. It is here that the irresponsible abuse of Marxist language—on the question of "revolutions without pause" proceeding in a straight line from State Plans to "Communism"—makes it imperative to show, not only the blind alley into which the dialectic of Mao's thought has led and from which it may catapult the world into a nuclear holocaust, but also to show that which is opposite from both the state-capitalist powers and the general global struggle with the United States for world domination. That is to say, it is imperative to illumine the path of freedom.

In Place Of A Conclusion: Two Kinds of Subjectivity

"... the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality... rest upon this subjectivity alone." — Hegel's
Science of Logic

"... in this (*Science of Logic*) most idealistic of Hegel's works, there is the least idealism and the most materialism. 'Contradictory' but a fact!" — Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*

Two kinds of subjectivity characterize our age of state-capitalism and workers' revolts. One is the subjectivism that we have been

considering—Mao's—which has no regard for objective conditions, behaves as if state power is for herding 650 million human beings into so-called "People's Communes," as if a party of the elite that is armed can both harness the energies of men and "remold" their minds. We have seen the results of this type of subjectivism permeated with, to use a Hegelian phrase, "a certainty of its own actuality and the non-actuality of the world," ready to ride the whirlwind of a nuclear holocaust.

The second type of subjectivity, the one which rests on "the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality," is the subjectivity which has "absorbed" objectivity, that is to say, through its struggle for freedom it gets to know and cope with the objectively real. Its maturity unfolds, as Marx put it in *Critique of the Hegelian Dialectique* "when actual corporeal Man, standing on firm and well rounded earth, inhaling and exhaling all natural forces... does not depart from its 'pure activity' in order to create the object... We see here how thorough-going Naturalism, or Humanism, distinguishes itself both from Idealism and Materialism, and, at the same time, is the truth uniting both."

Our epoch is the epoch of the struggle for the minds of men. To engage in this struggle, and clear one's head, it appears to me necessary to focus on these two types of subjectivity of which I can give here* only a few indications.

In 1956 these two types of subjectivity came into head-on collision in Hungary.²⁹⁶ The Hungarian Revolution put an end to the illusion that workers or peasants or intellectuals can be brainwashed. It put an end to the pretense that Communism and Marxism are one. It raised the banner of Marxist Humanism as freedom from Communism. In the great tradition of Marx who had written that Communism is "not the goal of human development, the form of human society," the Hungarian Freedom Fighters moved away from totalitarian state centralization to decentralized Workers' Councils, Youth Councils, Councils of Intellectuals—that is to say a form of rule where the individual and society are not opposed to each other because the freedom of the individual is the proof, the only proof, of the freedom of all.

* This is the burden of my new work in progress.

This outburst of elemental activity and organization of thought was bloodily suppressed by the counter-revolutionary might of Russia which, with the help of its Chinese cohorts, branded this Humanism as "revisionism." Mao had good reason to help his Russian partner because, as he himself put it, "Certain people in our country were delighted when the Hungarian events took place. They hoped that something similar would happen in China . . ." 297 To the extent that Mao was able to suppress his opposition without an open civil war, to the extent that he usurped the Marxist banner—both in general and in the specific use of one word, "Commune," that has always stood among Marxists for self-liberation (the Paris Commune of 1871)—to that extent some newly independent African nations were attracted to it.

However, just as it is impossible to hide the hunger rampant in the so-called "Peoples Communes," 298 so it is impossible to cover up the fact that within China, as within each modern country, there is a fundamental division into classes. Mao has no magic by which to turn these antagonistic contradictions into a mere difference between what he calls the "old" and the "new." Far from being a mere opposition between the existent and the not-yet existent, it is an open struggle between two antagonistic forms of reality that co-exist. *The co-existence of oppressor and oppressed is the determining factor also in proving the non-viability of Chinese state-capitalism that calls itself Communist.*

Mao admits that, just as under ordinary private capitalism, the basic contradictions in Chinese society "are still those between the relations of production and the productive forces, and between the superstructure and the economic base." This is precisely the fatal flaw which, in 1943, compelled the Russian theoreticians to revise Marx's economic theory of value.

No matter by what name they are called, capitalistic relationships, at the point of production, reveal their exploitative nature. Why Russia "chose" to revise Marx's economic theories, and why China "chose" to revise Marx's philosophy, is due both to the totality of the world crisis and to the important industrial differences between the two countries.

Russia has become an important industrial land, a country that possesses values. China is a vast underdeveloped land, whose

main possession is not the machine, but 650 million human beings.

It is precisely this backwardness which has pushed China forward to pose—only to pose but not to solve—its crisis in human terms. It cannot hide, however, the duality, the irreconcilable duality between China's new ruling class and the millions it exploits. Nor can it cover up the fact that the division of the world into two nuclear giants fighting for world domination—the United States and Russia—extends to the little Caesars in each camp—not only de Gaulle in "the West" but Mao in "the East."

Mao's failure to grasp dialectic logic has nothing whatever to do with "understanding philosophy." Dialectic logic is the logic of freedom and can be grasped only by those engaged in the actual struggle for freedom. Therein lies the key to the fulfillment of human potentialities and therein lies that new relationship between theory and practice which could lessen the birthpangs of industrialization. Anything else is the type of subjectivism which hides Mao's compelling need to transform the struggle for the minds of men into a drive to brainwash them.

The remorseless logic of this engulfed Mao himself and led him to elaborate a theory, not of revolution, but of retrogression. The objective compulsion for such "theories" flows, of course, from the brutal form of state-capitalism characteristic of China. Just as the bankruptcy of capitalism in general was accompanied by the bankruptcy of its thought, so the extension of state-capitalism into the misnamed "communes" was accompanied by Mao's threadbare thought, the true end of the absence of any philosophic method. Where Stalin, when admitting that the operation of the law of value in his "socialist country," felt compelled to force a separation between the law of value and the law of surplus value in order to try to deny the existence of classes under socialism, Mao proclaims this loudly as "socialism." Despite this thoroughly capitalistic concept of socialism; despite the concrete and total exploitation of the Chinese masses; despite the concrete invasions by China of other lands; and despite the voices of revolt within China itself against its Communist masters, Mao's abstract revolutionary thunder abroad gets the supports of militants, especially intellectuals, in and outside of the Communist Parties. It is a sad commentary on our times and exposes how totally lacking in any confidence in the

self-activity of the masses are today's claimants to the title, "Marxist-Leninist." Their militancy gains momentum only where there is a state power to back it up. It is the mark of our state-capitalist era that our "revolutionary" petty-bourgeoisie fears the self-mobilizing of the proletarian masses even more than do the powers that be, and seem incapable of acting without the support of a state power.

The subjectivity of the millions struggling for freedom, on the other hand, poses the need for a new relationship between theory and practice. The freedom struggles are not limited to Hungary or Africa, Russia or China; they include the United States²⁹⁹ and Western Europe as well. The challenge is for a new unity of Notion and Reality which will release the vast untapped energies of mankind to put an end, once and for all, to what Marx called the *pre*-history of humanity so that its true history can finally unfold.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

CULTURAL REVOLUTION OR
MAOIST REACTION

NOW THAT THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION has slowed its pace, there is time to take a closer look at this startling phenomenon.

The Red Guards may appear to have emerged out of nowhere but on August 18, 1966 they arrived one million strong in para-military formation to hear Defense Minister Lin Piao, Mao's "closest comrade in arms," explain the big-character poster "*Bombard The Headquarters.*" They learned that the headquarters were those of the Communist Party where they would find "persons in authority taking the road back to capitalism." When these teenagers streamed out of the square they seemed armed with something harder than "Mao's Thought."

For the next month the bourgeois press had a field day describing the rampage against "all the old" in China, from Confucian texts and priceless art treasures, to many Communist leaders. It was even more bizarre to follow the young Maoists' attacks on Western imperialism, not so much the living, barbarous U.S. imperialism that was raining bombs on a Communist ally, North Vietnam, but against "Hong Kong haircuts" and the "bourgeois-feudal reactionary music of Bach, Beethoven and Shostakovitch."

Within a couple of months these teen-age hooligans were doing more than roaming the streets, putting dunce caps on "anti-revolutionaries." By the end of 1966, a proliferation of Red Guard and "Red Rebel" groups had abandoned their forays against foreign embassies to go into formerly forbidden ground, the factories and fields. "Seize control committees" tried to oust established factory managers while imitating them in lording it over the workers and forbidding strikes. Soon not only the Western press but the official Chinese press was talking of "civil war."