by Ralph Keller
As the world moves into 2025, the war in Ukraine rages on. Russia makes slow yet steady gains on the battlefield while Western allies debate whether to keep Ukraine in the fight at all or halt military aid. In this context. I consider five connected points, namely: Ukraine’s war efforts and the impact of Trump taking the White House again; the death of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny; opposition to Putin and the war within Russia; opposition outside of Russia—the complicated case of Germany; as well as the EU’s geopolitical interest as entangled in the war.
Ukraine’s War Efforts
When Ukraine launched its incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024, many observers hailed this move as an opportunity to pressure Putin and to show the world, ahead of the US presidential elections, that Ukraine’s military is capable of more than merely resisting. For some, the incursion inspired hope that Ukraine could force Russia to come to the negotiating table. Indeed, the incursion marked the first time since WWII that a foreign power had dared to invade Russian soil.
Russia had not initially taken the incursion seriously. An indication of this was that it took some time for Russia to commit troops from other parts of the front to stop Ukraine from advancing. The reason was that Russia believed that Ukraine, by withdrawing forces from critical areas with which to mount the incursion, would weaken vital sectors of its defence and would make it easy for Russia to take further ground. Indeed, Sky News’ defence analyst Michael Clarke stated early on that Russia might try “to sit this one out.”[1] Only after Ukrainian forces kept taking ground and destroyed three bridges did the Kremlin respond in earnest. In terms of the bigger picture, the incursion did not force Putin to come to the negotiating table, and Russia indeed made further gains along other parts of the front line—albeit at the usual heavy losses.
Another significant development since the summer of 2024 is that Ukrainian forces now launch repeated drone attacks on installations on Russian soil. These attacks take place without US or UK approval, and it appears that Ukraine has become frustrated with the slow delivery of military aid. For example, one commentator on YouTube went as far as to characterize the Western approach of managing escalation as providing not enough aid to win, while sending just enough for Ukraine not to lose. At best, though, this is a problematic account of the situation because it assumes that Ukraine would win with unlimited aid being delivered more speedily. But this is doubtful because sending NATO troops is, at least for the time being, a red line that no-one was willing to cross. Further, unlimited weaponry alone will not win the war.
Political cartoon by Carlos Latuff. Credit: reddit
In response to Western military aid arriving slowly, Ukraine started producing its own long-range missiles, as well as reconnaissance and combat drones. Ukrainian-made weaponry has been used heavily to strike at Russian air bases, command-and-control hubs, logistics centres and energy infrastructure—all deep within Russia’s interior, forcing Russia to divert parts of the air force away from the front line. An assessment by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that Kyiv had disrupted 14% of Russia’s oil refining capacity and driven up domestic fuel prices by 20%-30% as of mid-March 2024.
Eventually, Russia responded in earnest, pulling troops away from other parts of the front, they also invoked a treaty between North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and Putin. The agreement stipulates that both countries must come to each other’s aid when their respective territories are under threat, a condition fulfilled by Ukraine’s incursion. Thus, the incursion was the spark that Putin needed under the agreement to bring troops from North Korea to the front line.
With the results of this escalation emerging, pro-Ukrainian commentators have been cheering. So far, the fresh troops have not made much of an impact on the battlefield, allegedly because they are ill-prepared. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, Russia has taken back 40% of the territory held by the Ukrainian incursion. Moreover, these gains on the battlefield by Russia come at a terrible cost of men and material, especially in the Donetsk region. However, in another unexpected turn of events that happened 5 January 2025, Ukraine launched a second surprise offensive in the Kursk region.
Ukraine’s new offensive was well timed, following as it did the fall of Assad’s regime, whom a weakened Russia could not keep in power, and preceding Trump’s certification by Congress on 6 January 2025. Still, it remains to be seen how effective and lasting the new offensive will be. This is especially the case as future military aid from the US will likely stop once Trump takes office again on 20 January 2025. While having repeatedly criticised US military spending for Ukraine, he hopes that cutting aid completely will force Ukraine to come to the negotiating table. Indeed, when asked whether he wants Ukraine to win the war, Trump is on record saying “I want the war to stop, I want to save lives.” Zelenskyy, too, thinks the war will end quicker under Trump than it otherwise would, but is that really the case?
Trump reportedly asked Xi to help end the war, yet it is doubtful whether Xi will support Trump. Instead, Xi and Putin held a video call during which both leaders praised their strong bilateral ties. This might be considered a humiliation for a weak Trump.
Be this as it may, is a quick end to the war really the best outcome for Ukraine? Commentators now say openly that forcing Ukraine into negotiations means that i) territorial concessions will be inevitable; and that ii) NATO will not expand into Ukraine. Both concessions would be victories for Putin, meaning that Ukraine will be weakened before negotiations have even begun. In this context, this Gallup survey finds that 52% of the Ukrainian population favour an end to the war by negotiations. And yet, Ukrainians have not lost their will to keep fighting for the time being. This raises the question as to why some in the West, including so-called leftists, are eager to speak over the Ukrainian people and demand negotiations that Ukrainians would not gain from.
The answer to this question touches on three reasons. First, there is Campism, i.e., the idea that “NATO is my enemy, it always has been, and Russia is not actually that bad.” We see this with the older generation of leftists who lived in the Soviet satellite states before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Tangled up in this are “Tankies,” or Stalinist apologists, who have recently had somewhat of a renaissance.
Second, there is the view that stopping the killing is the most pressing issue, and losing territory is a small price to pay. But this is not the leftists’ call to make; it is instead the choice of the Ukrainian people. For now, the keep fighting for self-determination and territorial integrity, which is the call that has a real impact on the war. The leftist’s call, by contrast, is rather inconsequential. Third, some leftists align themselves with their rulers who have the financial cost of the military aid in mind or are of the view that “we have no horse in this race anyway.”
The third reason for those in the West who call for negotiations is, as history shows, rather dangerous. During Germany’s Nazi era, Western allies allowed Hitler to annex parts of Czechoslovakia in hopes of appeasing him and to prevent another war in Europe. These politics of appeasement turned out to be one of history’s greatest blunders. We must not have a repeat of this with Putin, especially since the West previously allowed him to annex Crimea in 2014. After all, what is to stop Putin from starting future wars to annex yet more territory? Therefore, it is important to note that, under Biden’s leadership, the West has not stopped or cut military aid to force Ukraine into making territorial concessions. However, once in office, Trump may cut military aid, encouraging the events of the first half of the 20th century to unfold again in modern form.
Meanwhile, questions have arisen about Beijing’s reaction to the North Korea-Russia treaty and Pyongyang sending 10,000 troops. Beijing has maintained a low profile thus far, indicating it is up to two sovereign nations to forge treaties as they please. Nevertheless, wild speculations are now circulating. One example is speculation as to whether NATO will send its own troops to Ukraine. Another is whether there will be an Asian NATO consisting of Russia, China, and North Korea.
I prefer not to speculate on these points. Still, it would not be far-fetched to argue that North Korean troops fighting abroad will cause China to hedge its bets in terms of its own geopolitical and imperialistic ambitions. For example, Beijing would watch any developments that lead to North Korea no longer acting as a security buffer. This may lead to South Korea, Japan, and the US strengthening their ties. The Guardian speculates in this context that it will be harder in the future for China to maintain the balancing act between its political allies and its Western economic partners.
Others speculate whether a Russian victory in Ukraine would make NATO more cohesive, leading to a hardening of the West’s stance against China, or whether Trump will “arm Ukraine to the teeth” if Putin refuses to negotiate a ceasefire. In my view, such hopes are a delusion, especially under Trump, where the opposite is much more likely to materialize—Trump will be far more likely to abandon Ukraine and will continue to threaten North Korea with obliteration, as he did during his first stint in the White House (RTR, 2018, p.10).
This has become an even greater concern than last time because he is now hard at work to implement Project 2025. Part of this project is to replace generals and other civil servants with unvetted Trump loyalists. “He says ‘jump,’ we say, ‘how high?’” his cronies proudly boast. If Project 2025 succeeds, then those characters will be in charge of the nuclear arsenal, which Trump wanted to increase tenfold during his last presidency (RTR, 2018, p.11). These concerns are not fearmongering and have nothing to do with a leftist fantasy; they instead are a reality following the Supreme Court’s ruling that Trump cannot legally be held accountable while in office.
The current situation regarding Ukraine and its Western allies, then, is inconclusive. I will return below to a consideration of one of Ukraine’s allies, Germany, and its tangled thicket of war-related political developments. For now, I turn to the situation inside of Russia, where several factors could contribute to the outcome of the war. And, as will be seen below, this distinction, between what is happening inside of Russia and what is happening inside of Germany, turns out to be somewhat misleading anyway.
The Killing of Alexey Navalny
Alexey Navalny had been Russia’s opposition leader for some time, even surviving a poison attack, which the West said was the Kremlin’s doing. Navalny was arrested upon his return to Russia, tried, convicted of extremism, and incarcerated in a gulag-like Arctic penal colony. The Russian media announced his death on 16 February 2024, citing “natural causes.” Western media and politicians, as well as his wife Yulia Navalnaya, however, do not accept the official story and blame the Kremlin for Navalny’s death.
During the recent launch of her husband’s memoir, titled “Patriot”, at the literature festival at London’s Southbank Centre, Navalnaya stated that she could “imagine a Russia without Putin,” and that, though it “could take a very, very long time,” it could also “happen tomorrow–like everything happens in Russia.” Navalnaya also said she would not be able to continue her husband’s work, including leading the Anti-Corruption Foundation he founded, if she did not believe there could be an alternative to Putin. Indeed, she is ready to run for president, but is under no illusion that she can do so while she remains outside of Russia. Navalnaya also stresses that everyone can do “something very small” every day to fight the regime and push Russia towards being a “normal, democratic” country. This might include posting on social media or speaking to a colleague. “It means a lot,” she added. So, is there opposition against the war within Russia, and, if so, how active is it?
Opposition Within Russia
Looking beyond Navalnaya’s emergence as a prominent figure of the opposition, the opposition includes, there where, reportedly, 302 protest organisations in Russia as of October 2023. In addition, there are reports scattered across the internet indicating how ordinary Russians resist the Putin regime without a large body or leader: in short, people self-organise.
Here we learn that thousands of activists had been protesting Putin’s dictatorship even before the war against the Ukraine began, and new protests sprang up following the invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, women distribute underground pamphlets and organise pickets and peaceful demonstrations. One particular case of self-organisation is a group that channels the voices of the growing anti-war sentiment among younger and older Russians, even capturing the frustration of those who supported the war at some point but have now broken with that sentiment. The group, who controls a printing press and occasionally hijacks resources from a nearby university, relies on an old school resistance method called Samizdat (i.e., self-publishing), covertly printing and distributing fliers. Titles of the 21st century Samizdats include:
- Prisma Queer. I was unable to find a web presence, but Prisma is an organisation that supports the LGBTQIA+ community to prevent racism and discrimination
- The Moscow Times, now outlawed in Russia as an “undesirable organization”
- The Feminist Anti-War Resistance on Telegram
The situation contains a satirical element because it is the local bourgeoisie that contributes financially to the costs of hearing about its leader’s sins. It must be acknowledged, however, that the group operates underground, which restricts its activities and, therefore, its effectiveness.
Some of these organizations’ work goes beyond publishing Samizdat. Consider how Putin’s war has triggered the rise of a new political force: the above-mentioned Feminist Resistance Against War, an underground movement which active at home and abroad. Importantly, this movement has no hierarchy, and decisions are made via video conferencing as well as using anonymous bots on the Telegram messenger service. The Russian state powers have given the movement the status of “foreign agent.”
This Human Rights Watch article stresses that the government can label any person or entity that “engages in civic activism or even expresses opinions about Russian policies or officials’ conduct … so long as the authorities claim” that the person or entity is “under ‘foreign’ influence.” Clearly, this is “another attack on free expression and legitimate activism in Russia.” The “foreign agent” label has led to activists and coordinators frequently being stopped in public, fined or arrested. It has also meant having their houses searched and computers seized.
Other examples of the underground resistance include protests on social media, avoiding the draft by leaving the country, or the activism labelled “guerrilla movement.” This resistance reportedly attacks military installations and attempts to derail trains carrying equipment bound for Ukraine. From the partisans of WWII with love. Another form of guerrilla resistance is to place anti-war information about military operations and losses on popular Russian social media sites, e.g., on VKontakte and Odnoklassniki.
For long before the war even began, women in Russia regularly took to the streets to protest violence and misogyny. When it did, the women’s movement grew stronger, not only through anti-war protests, but also through taking on board the task of helping Ukrainians made homeless by the war, or stepping up when men are being conscripted or come back from the war unable to work. They stress that “as long as Russian missiles fly over Ukrainian cities, as long as women, men, children and the elderly die in Ukraine at the hands of Russian soldiers, we cannot stop.”
But is there now an open resistance movement? An online article states that, “driven by economic hardship and war fatigue, Russians are increasingly in favour of withdrawing troops from Ukraine without achieving the war’s objectives.” This indicates that many Russians wish for Putin to end the conflict, expressing sentiments such as:
Perhaps there will be a coup of far-right dissenters.
[After the war], we will be worrying that Ukraine will come to us – like Napoleon did to Moscow.
It will get worse – because the [Western] sanctions are working harder and harder.
If the war ends next year, economic recovery will begin in two years.
Just give us peace – that’s all!
Only a small minority of Russians would consider open protest, however, and an even smaller minority do engage in it as of now. Examples include anti-war solidarity, such as signing anti-war letters, or unions protecting their members. There are instances of prominent figures such as TV presenters speaking out openly, only to lose their jobs, have their titles taken away, and their names removed from public view. The scarceness of open protest is a consequence of systematic oppression over the years, a sense of powerlessness among ordinary people, of an unwillingness to do something about the situation oneself, and of public denunciations reminiscent of the Soviet era. This situation has triggered a sentiment that “only bread riots might change the situation. But that looks unlikely.”
In the article above, sociologist Oleg Zhuravlev sums up the situation, arguing that “the moral condemnation of the war in society, although strong, has not yet turned into an anti-war political position … A possible exception is the relatives of the mobilised, who are actively protesting. This is a new movement. Let’s see if it can influence public sentiment and politics.” Zhuravlev’s characterisation pertains to open protest, but as we saw, there is underground protest in Russia at an unprecedented scale.
However, one cannot conclude, in my view, that the Russian people will overthrow Putin. It is important, therefore, to keep Ukraine in the fight, as discussed previously. In addition, keeping Ukraine in the fight is important because the mounting losses of Russian soldiers might eventually exhaust Putin and the army, which would then strengthen the resistance against the war within Russia.
Opposition Outside of Russia—the Complicated Case of Germany
I want to close by discussing the situation in Germany. Historically, the right and the left there have had a complicated relationship when it comes to war and peace. In a nutshell, during the Weimar Republic of 1918 – 1933, we saw what has been labelled “Querfront,” or Cross-front. The label describes antidemocratic tendencies that attempted to marry far-right national socialist[2] and far-left socialist ideas. This article argues that, today, we again see a “far-right attempt to mainstream and especially to coopt left-wing and centrist peace mobilization as part of a ‘Querfront’ (‘cross-front’) strategy, embedded in a more broader targeting of parts of the political left.” Indeed, anti-war protests in Germany regularly draw crowds from both ends of the political spectrum. The Washington Post writes that in this context, marrying Germany’s far right and the far left is a Kremlin goal, according to a trove of Russian documents reviewed by The Post.
But what are the right’s motivations? The same Washington Post article states that “a proposed manifesto for the AfD that was written by Kremlin political strategists, includes forging the AfD into the party of ‘German unity’ and declaring sanctions on Russia as counter to German interests.” Moreover, “inadequate politicians, unable to calculate the consequences of their decisions, have dragged Germany into conflict with Russia — a natural ally of our country and of our people…Our interests demand the restoration of normal partnership relations with Russia.” While it is unclear whether the manifesto ever reached anyone inside the AfD, the AfD does indeed echo the Kremlin’s view that the war in Ukraine was triggered by the United States, and that Russia was simply defending itself from NATO.
MHI rejected this view in its editorial titled Ukraine Fights for National Self-Determination, demonstrating that Putin’s motivation for invading the Ukraine is Russian imperialism. Indeed, Putin himself stated that his motives are rebuilding the empire of the Tsars as well as that of Stalin. The invasion was thus a repeat of how Russia seized Crimea in 2014, and “that Putin suffered little retaliation … undoubtedly emboldened him now.”
Sahra Wagenknecht, leader of Germany’s Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, rejects the idea of any cooperation or alliance with elements of the AfD, yet her public appearances regularly draws crowds from AfD supporters. I do not consider this her fault or responsibility, given that, as argued, it is the right that coopts left-wing peace mobilisation. However, Wagenknecht decried the prospect that German tanks, soon to be delivered to Ukraine, could once again be used to shoot at “Russian women and men.” Yes, one can, and perhaps should, call this position out as Putin friendly, yet there is more to it.
Many Germans hold the sentiment that “East is a highly unfavourable direction for German tanks.” This is not merely a pacifist stance; it is a severe figurative headache given Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union during WWII. I have the same headache, but I can live with the idea that Germany sends military aid to support Ukraine in the fight against the Russian invaders. Sending troops would, however, be at another level altogether. I would not support it—given Germany’s history during the first half of the 20th century—as I fear Germany would rise to become a military superpower again. While I am aware that sending troops East might become inevitable in the future, if Ukraine loses the war and Putin feels emboldened to invade the Baltic states, this would not ease my headache for, after all, there is always an alternative to war: diplomacy.
Geopolitical Entanglement
Entangled in the intricate German peace movement are geopolitical interests, especially since Germany, more so than other EU countries, has been on Russia’s drip ever since Angela Merkel increased the acquisition of cheap Russian oil and gas during her 16-year run as German chancellor. Current chancellor Olaf Scholz stopped the approval procedure for Nord Stream 2, a pipeline project in the Eastern Sea from Russia to Germany, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, cost considerations again lie behind the announcement of Germany halting new aid for Ukraine, as well as behind Olaf Scholz speaking to Putin for the first time in years in an effort to kick off peace negotiations. The hope is that an end to the war will bring down the extortionate energy prices in the EU. However, Scholz’s efforts have been criticised, for example by Zelenskyy, as a move aimed at appeasing Putin, which in turn undermines Western efforts to isolate him.
EU on life support. Credit: cartoonmovement.com
Whereas I might agree that Scholz intends to appease Putin by making territorial concessions, I do not agree that Scholz undermines international isolation efforts. This is because the West’s failure to cut off Russian oil and gas completely is a far greater factor that hinders efforts to isolate Putin. At last, the EU has now reduced its dependence on Russian oil and gas, as the European Commission’s official “State of the Energy Union Report 2024”, p.2 shows (emphasis in original):
The EU achieved 18% of gas demand reduction between August 2022 and May 2024. This resulted in about 138 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas saved. With EU sanctions banning seaborne imports of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products as well as Russian coal, imports of Russian gas (pipeline & LNG) dropped from a 45% share of overall EU gas imports in 2021, to only 18% up to August 2024.
To quickly replace Russian gas supply and ensure Europe’s energy security in the short-medium term, the EU reached out to other international suppliers. Norway and the U.S. have become the EU’s largest gas suppliers—for pipeline and LNG gas respectively—providing 34% and 18% of EU gas imports in the first half of 2024.
Nevertheless, I argue that Western bourgeois interests help to prevent the complete collapse of the Russian economy and help Putin to prolong the war. I acknowledge, in this respect, that the EU cannot simply stop buying Russian oil and gas because Western European economies depend on it. This is the result of short-sighted decisions based on reducing costs over many years. At long last, the EU understands the geopolitical implications of its entanglement with Russia and is taking pains to reduce its energy dependence. We will soon see how successful the EU’s efforts are.
Notes
[1] I quote from memory because I am unable to locate the source.
[2] The word Nazi is short for Nationalsozialist, i.e., a national socialist.
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